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Reason and Common Ground: A Response to The 
Creationists’ “Neutrality” Argument 
Timothy Sandefur* 
What science has to teach us is not its techniques but its spirit: the irresistible 
need to explore . . . .  It has created the values of our intellectual life and, with the 
arts, has taught them to our civilization.  Science has nothing to be ashamed of 
even in the ruins of Nagasaki.  The shame is theirs who appeal to other values 
than the human imaginative values which science has evolved.  The shame is 
ours if we do not make science part of our world, intellectually as much as physi-
cally, so that we may at last hold these halves of our world together by the same 
values. 
–Jacob Bronowski1 
In my opinion, a recent article in the Chapman Law Review, address-
ing the controversy over teaching evolution and/or creationism in public 
school classrooms, fell beneath the acceptable standard of scholarly dis-
course.2  The author, Stephen Trask, failed to address obvious objections to 
his thesis, cited virtually none of the scholarly literature on the subject3—
even the literature that might support his thesis4—and found not a shred of 
support in the caselaw.  This might be good reason simply to ignore the ar-
ticle, except that the argument Trask advanced appears to be growing in 
* J.D. 2002, Chapman University School of Law; B.A. 1998, Hillsdale College.  Mr. Sandefur is  
a contributor to Panda’s Thumb (www.pandasthumb.org) a weblog devoted to the evolution-
creationism conflict.  Thanks to Glenn Branch of the National Center for Science Education; Dave 
Thomas of New Mexicans for Science and Reason; Ed Brayton of Dispatches from the Culture Wars 
(http://scienceblogs.com/dispatches); Tibor Machan of Chapman University; Peter Irons of the Univer-
sity of California at San Diego; and Wesley R. Elsberry, Michigan State University.  The views ex-
pressed in this article are entirely my own.  Some of the material presented herein appeared in earlier 
versions in my posts to Panda’s Thumb.   I would like to dedicate this article to the memory of my 
grandfather, Kermit L. Sandefur, a Kansan, a man of science, and a man who did not suffer fools glad-
ly. 
 1 J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 72–73 (rev. ed. 1965). 
 2 Stephen W. Trask, Evolution, Science And Ideology: Why the Establishment Clause Requires 
Neutrality in Science Classes, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 359 (2006). 
 3 See, e.g., Matthew J. Brauer, et al., Is It Science Yet?: Intelligent Design Creationism And The 
Constitution, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2005); Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: 
Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2003); Colin McRoberts 
& Timothy Sandefur, Piercing the Veil of Intelligent Design: Why Courts Should Beware Creationism’s 
Secular Disguise, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 15 (2005). 
 4 See, e.g., Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, And The Challenge 
of Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 461, 469 (2003) (“exclud[ing] non-
materialist . . . accounts of natural phenomena . . . is . . . at worst, intellectual imperialism.”); Andrew 
A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education Toward Religion: Why Parental Choice 
Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion Clauses, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 697, 716 (1997) (schools 
teaching religion and other matters are “[n]urturing of a [s]ecular [w]orld [v]iew.”). 
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popularity among creationists of all stripes.5  Moreover, hopes that crea-
tionism, or for that matter Postmodernism, would collapse under their own 
weight have so far not paid out.6  Sometimes it behooves us to make clear 
why balderdash is, indeed, balderdash. 
First, we will begin with the obvious.  Evolution by natural selection 
is a fact—a well-established, thoroughly documented, experimentally 
tested, observationally confirmed, real fact.  Some contend that evolution 
need not conflict with religious belief, but for many others, it presents a 
real crisis.7  And, as might be expected of a person against whose position 
the evidence is so strong, Trask tries instead to question the validity of evi-
dence, fact, and truth itself.  Picking up on various Postmodernist themes, 
he begins with the proposition that science is simply one of many equally 
valid ways of knowing, and that our society’s preference for those theories 
that have been established by evidence, experiment, and observation is 
simply a prejudice, reinforced by science’s “hegemony,” which “legitim-
ize[s] the exclusion of those who do not understand truth exclusively 
through empirical verification.”8  Science has no superior claim to truth;9 
relying on it instead of faith is simply a matter of subjective preference. 
Further, Trask argues, the Establishment Clause requires government 
to remain neutral, and to treat all “ways of knowing” as equal.  Science’s 
focus on natural causes rather than supernatural or magical causes,10 is it-
self a type of religion, and for government to endorse science, and particu-
 5 See, e.g., Jana R. McCreary, This Is The Trap The Courts Built: Dealing with The entangle-
ment of Religion And The Origin of Life in American Public Schools, 37 SW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=979529.  McCreary’s article came to my attention only 
while this article was in press, and time constraints preclude a thorough response to it.  McCreary, how-
ever, commits many of the same fallacies as Trask, in many instances more egregiously so.  Thus the 
present article will likely suffice.  Like Trask, McCreary defines atheism and science as religions, be-
cause she uses the following as a definition of religion: “‘something people do together to face urgent 
problems.’”  Id. at 5.  A vaguer definition could hardly be devised.  By this definition, everything from 
Sufism to membership in a political party to buying an umbrella in a rainstorm would qualify as reli-
gion!  See id. at 59 (defining “dogma” as “some sort of belief held” by either a religious or any kind of 
organization “that is authoritative and that is to be neither disputed nor doubted,” a definition which 
would apply, e.g., to belief that the earth exists).  Such wordplay allows McCreary to categorize science 
as a religion and then to argue, as Trask does, that the Establishment Clause forbids the teaching of 
science in public schools.  Id. 
 6 One excellent discussion of these matters is Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L. 
J. 453 (1996). 
 7 Trask is a creationist.  Stephen W. Trask, A Loving Designer, AgapeRevolution.com, 
http://agaperevolution.com/2006/03/22/bishop-of-canterbury-opposes-evolution-in-science-classes/ 
(March 22, 2006) (“the theory of evolution is theologically inconsistent with the Christian view of God.  
One of the most important elements of the Genesis creation account is not just that it records how the 
world was created, it is that God created the world through very specific means that reveals to us what 
kind of God he is. . . .  Although, God could have brought the world into being through a very slow evo-
lutionary process, it would really have been a wimpy God’s method of accomplishing the creation of 
the world.”).  He believes that the Supreme Court should overturn Edwards v. Aguillard, and allow the 
teaching of “alternatives to evolution science, such as creation science” in government schools.”  Trask, 
supra note 2 at 368, 390. 
 8 Trask, supra note 2, at 362–63. 
 9 Id. at 364. 
 10  I use the terms “supernatural,” “magical,” and “religious,” interchangeably. 
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larly of evolution—by teaching it in schools—is “forcibly indoctrinating 
students into the religion of secular humanism”11 and compelling them to 
undergo “religious instruction.”12  Government instead ought to remain 
“neutral” by teaching “alternative theories” to evolution in science classes, 
including explicitly “supernatural” ones. 
This argument is troubling for many reasons.  I will begin with the 
epistemological claim—that science is simply one among many different 
but equal paths to knowledge and that its ascendancy over other methods is 
due to conflicts between social power structures rather than any objective 
superiority.  I will also consider the related arguments that science’s exclu-
sive reliance on natural causes—so called “methodological naturalism”—is 
an a priori assumption, and that science or secularism is a “religion” which 
falls under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment.  In Part II, I will address whether the First Amendment re-
quires the government to remain “neutral” between supernatural and natu-
ralistic worldviews.  I will conclude with some observations on the conflict 
between science and supernaturalism in general. 
I.  SCIENCE AS A WAY OF KNOWING 
A.  Competing Epistemologies 
The scientific method is a tool of unmatched efficacy.  The practical 
benefits of science are incalculably vast.  While its fruits include such 
modern horrors as atomic weapons, it has also cured diseases, improved 
crop yields beyond the wildest dreams of former generations, harnessed 
energy on an unimaginable scale, and provided us with modern conve-
niences that have become such a part of our lives that we generally take 
them for granted.  Modern medical devices, automobiles and airplanes, tel-
ecommunications and computing, refrigeration and farming methods, 
weather satellites, nuclear attack submarines, comfortable shoes and plastic 
bags that keep salads fresh for weeks,13 all owe their existence to the scien-
tific focus on controlling nature by understanding and obeying her.14  In 
1900, life expectancy in the United States was 47.3 years.  Today it is 77.8 
years.15  Since 1900, infant mortality in the United States has decreased 90 
 11 Trask, supra note 2, at 365. 
 12 Id. at 390. 
 13 Recent years have seen the invention of the ready-to-eat salad pack, a remarkable piece of in-
genuity that owes its existence to specially designed polymer bags and a technique called “Modified 
Atmosphere Packaging.”  See B.P.F. Day, Perspective of Modified Atmosphere Packaging in Western 
Europe, 4 FOOD SCI. & TECH. TODAY 221 (1990). 
 14 Francis Bacon’s statement that “Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in 
contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule” is among the profound thoughts that make Ba-
con one of the founding fathers of the scientific revolution.  FRANCIS BACON, Novum Organum in 8 
THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 59, 68 (James Spedding, et al., eds., Taggard and Thompson, 1863). 
 15 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH UNITED STATES, 2006 WITH 
CHARTBOOK ON TRENDS IN THE HEALTH OF AMERICANS 176 tbl.27 (2006) available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf#027. 
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percent, and maternal mortality has decreased 99 percent.16  In 1900, the 
average worker labored 56 minutes to earn enough money to buy a half-
gallon of milk.  Today, it’s less than 7 minutes.  In 1910, it took the aver-
age worker two hours and forty minutes of labor to afford a three-pound 
chicken; today, it takes the same worker 14 minutes.17  Expensive food and 
high infant mortality rates were, until the Scientific and Industrial Revolu-
tions, simply facts of life.18 
Naming the practical benefits of science fails to get at the heart of the 
issue because science is not just its practical benefits.  Obviously, one of 
science’s great goals is to make such practical improvements; to provide, in 
Francis Bacon’s famous words, for “the relief of man’s estate.”19  But 
science is more than a collection of findings; it is a way of getting at the 
underlying structure of our world, and while it has proven its effectiveness 
in practical results, focusing only on its material benefits, and not the 
process, would lead to the problem made familiar in the old adage that if 
you give a man a fish he will eat for a day, but if you teach him to fish, he 
will eat for a lifetime.  Humanitarian efforts to bring the fruits of scientific 
research to the Third World may alleviate the poverty in which too many 
still live, but it is only by teaching others how to think scientifically, and 
giving them the intellectual tools they need to make future discoveries on 
their own, that human suffering and ignorance can be reduced. 
The scientific method requires observation of natural phenomena, the 
formation of hypotheses about their nature, the testing of those hypotheses 
through experiment, and the evaluation of the hypotheses in light of the ex-
perimental results.20  Science seeks “elegant” explanations which will ac-
count for the observed phenomena without unnecessary complications, and 
it seeks general laws that will explain phenomena in terms of simpler phe-
nomena.  In this way, it builds what Richard Feynman called a “hierarchy 
of ideas,” which tries to begin with “the fundamental laws of physics,” and 
lead “up in this hierarchy of complexity” towards “words and concepts like 
‘man,’ and ‘history,’ or ‘political expediency,’ and so forth.”21  This step-
by-step understanding is built by forming “invisible-hand explanations” 
which will seek to describe the explanandum in terms other than that which 
 16 Center for Disease Control, Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States 1900–1999, 
48 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (MMWR) 242 (1999) available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm4812.pdf. 
 17 W. MICHAEL COX AND RICHARD ALM, MYTHS OF RICH AND POOR: WHY WE’RE BETTER OFF 
THAN WE THINK 43 tbl.2.2 (1999). 
 18 Scientific and technological advancement are only among the more important of many factors 
that have improved the standard of living.  See generally NATHAN ROSENBERG AND L.E. BIRDZELL JR., 
HOW THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD (Basic 
Books 1985). 
 19 FRANCIS BACON, The Advancement of Learning, in 3 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 255, 
294 (James Spedding, et. al. eds., Longman & Co. 1857). 
 20 See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TEACHING ABOUT EVOLUTION AND THE NATURE OF 
SCIENCE ch. 3, available at http://books.nap.edu/html/evolution98/evol3.html (last visited Oct. 3, 
2007). 
 21 RICHARD FEYNMAN, THE CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAW 118–19 (Random House 1994). 
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is being explained—just as a dictionary will avoid using a word in its own 
definition.22  The ultimate goal is a unified and empirically sound under-
standing of the world. 
This understanding of the scientific enterprise flies in the face of the 
Postmodernist theories underlying Trask’s thesis.  According to Postmo-
dernism, there is no reality to be understood, or, if there is, it cannot be un-
derstood in an objective sense.  Instead, what we think of as understanding 
is really the construction of “narratives”—socially created worldviews 
which we adopt as “true,” but whose truth value runs no deeper than the 
language in which they are expressed.  Man cannot really connect to na-
ture; he is separated from reality by a kind of invisible and impenetrable 
bubble of language.  And these narratives, or paradigms, are tools or wea-
pons that are manipulated in a struggle for power between populations.  
The “truth” these narratives allegedly describe is really a trick for control-
ling people and obtaining resources for the privileged elites who are most 
responsible for constructing and maintaining our social structures. 
If nothing else,23 Postmodernism represents a direct attack on the En-
lightenment legacy, and particularly on science.24  The entire idea of for-
mulating a unified, reliable, objectively true description of the nature of the 
universe clashes with the postmodern vision that there are different “ways 
of knowing” that are equally valid—women’s ways of knowing, Eastern 
ways of knowing, and so forth.25  Science’s dream of discovering laws that 
can be understood by all humanity regardless of their various cultures is 
therefore doomed.  “If, as postmodernists would have it, meaning and truth 
are inexorably bound to context and historical setting, then the whole point 
of scientific theorizing would vanish, and science itself would have to be 
abandoned.”26 
Postmodernist theories appear to be growing in popularity among cre-
ationists, and particularly those of the Intelligent Design variety.27  Phillip 
 22 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 18–19 (1974) (describing “invisible 
hand” and “fundamental” explanations.). 
 23 There is good reason to believe there is nothing else.  See generally Dennis W. Arrow, Space-
ball (Or, Not Everything That’s Left is Postmodern), 54 VAND. L. REV. 2381 (2001); Dennis W. Arrow, 
“Rich,” “Textured,” and “Nuanced”: Constitutional “Scholarship” and Constitutional Messianism at 
the Millennium, 78 TEX. L. REV. 149 (1999); Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak 
and Constitutional “Meaning” for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997). 
 24 See ALAN D. SOKAL AND JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN 
INTELLECTUALS’ ABUSE OF SCIENCE (Picador USA 1998). 
 25 There is an eerie similarity here to the Nazi claim that “Jewish science” was somehow distinct 
from Deutsche physic. WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 250 (New York: 
Touchstone, 1981) (1960). 
 26 Loren Fishman, Feelings And Beliefs, in THE FLIGHT FROM SCIENCE AND REASON 87, 95 
(Paul. R. Gross et al. eds., 1996). 
 27 See Noam Scheiber, Science Fiction, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 5, 2005 at 6 (“postmodernist ideas 
have become a staple of the ID movement.”); Stanley Fish, Academic Cross Dressing: How Intelligent 
Design gets its arguments from the left, HARPER’S, Dec. 2005 at 70–72; Posting of Nick Matzke to 
Panda’s Thumb, ID = Postmodern Creationism, http://www.pandasthumb.org/archives/2005/08/ 
id_postmodern_c.html  (Aug. 4, 2005, 11:26 PM). 
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 teaching of creationism as based in power, ra-
ther 
But Postmodernism is ultimately an empty philosophy31—if it is a 
Johnson, whose books attacking evolution are a cornerstone of the ID 
movement, has declared his allegiance to Postmodern notions such as de-
constructivism.28  Francis Beckwith, probably the most prominent defender 
of creationism in the legal academy, argues in many of his articles that 
science’s methodological naturalism is no more or less valid than the em-
brace of supernaturalism among religious believers and that granting 
science any greater prestige is “intellectual imperialism.”29  David DeWolf 
and other writers affiliated with the pro-ID Discovery Institute contend that 
scientists have “wielded demarcation arguments as a way of protecting the 
Darwinist hegemony in public education,” and portray the scientific com-
munity’s opposition to the
than in evidence.30 
                                                          
 28 See ROBERT T. PENNOCK, TOWER OF BABEL: THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE NEW CREATIONISM 
210 (1999) (quoting Johnson: “After a morning of writing I met Political Science professor Patricia 
Boling who hosted a noon colloquium for the department faculty and grad students.  I told them I was 
postmodernist and deconstructionist just like them, but aiming at a slightly different target.”).  Johnson, 
however, has elsewhere claimed that he is not a Postmodernist.  Scheiber, supra note 27 at 71 (quoting 
Johnson: “I’m no postmodernist.”).  See also MICHAEL RUSE, MYSTERY OF MYSTERIES: IS EVOLUTION 
 SO
ing The Origins Controversy: Science, Or Religion, Or Speech? 
000
hey deny the truth when it is declared to them: but they shall learn the 
M, THE 
A CIAL CONSTRUCTION? (1999). 
 29 Beckwith, supra note 4, at 469. 
 30 David K. DeWolf, et al., Teach
2  UTAH L. REV. 39, 73–74 (2000). 
 31 The factual, not to say ethical, weakness of Postmodernist relativism has long led Christians to 
distance themselves from it.  After all, Christianity, like other religions, is based on the notion that there 
is, indeed, one God at least—or at most, see Exodus 20:2–3 (King James) (“I am the LORD thy 
God . . . Thou shalt have no other gods before me”)—that both He and the world around us are real and 
that God placed people in it and has manipulated it as an objective fact.  Those who deny these truth-
claims are not simply people with different narratives; according to Christianity as to many other faiths, 
those who deny the objective, factual nature of God’s existence, the story of Jesus, and other truth-
claims are alleged to be wrong.  See, e.g., John 14:6 (King James) (“Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, 
the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me.”); 2 Timothy 2:12–13 (King James) 
(“If we suffer, we shall also reign with him: if we deny him, he also will deny us: If we believe not, yet 
he abideth faithful: he cannot deny himself.”); 2 Peter 2:1 (King James) (“But there were false prophets 
also among the people, even as there shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in 
damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruc-
tion.”).  See also Sura 6:5 (THE KORAN) (N.J. Dawood, trans., London: Penguin Classics 1999 at 93) 
(“He is God in the heavens on earth. . . .  Yet every time a revelation comes to them from their Lord, 
they pay no heed to it.  Thus do t
consequences of their scorn.”).   
It is ironic indeed to find Trask defending creationism on Postmodern grounds, given that Christians 
(and members of other religious groups) have long been concerned about the extreme moral and cultur-
al relativism that lies at the heart of Postmodernism.  Indeed, some Christian philosophers have argued 
that the Intelligent Design version of creationism is an effective way to avoid the relativistic doctrines 
of Postmodernism.  See, e.g., J.P. Moreland, Postmodernism And The Intelligent Design Movement, 1 
PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 97, 101 (1999) (arguing that Intelligent Design creationism will provide Chris-
tians with “the rudder necessary to media [sic] between the Scylla of scientific naturalism and the Cha-
rybdis of post modernism.”)  Postmodernism—largely sponsored by thinkers who seek to avoid the 
often violent clashes between cultures and societies that differ on fundamentals—seeks to defuse con-
flicts by denying their reality.  But this is as contrary to Christian teaching as it is to secular ones.  
Simply put, Christianity is incompatible with Postmodernism.  See, e.g., Matthew 10:33–34 (King 
James) (“whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in hea-
ven.  Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword.”); Revela-
tion 3:16 (King James) (“So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spue thee 
out of my mouth.”).  See also THE DEATH OF TRUTH: RESPONDING TO MULTICULTURALIS
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philosophy at all.  For all its fashionable jargon, Postmodernism cannot un-
do the fact that reality is reality, and that in understanding the world around 
us, we run up against objectively true facts that simply cannot be denied.32  
Postmodernism is a kind of solipsism, impossible for any but the suicidal to 
take seriously.  As Richard Dawkins has eloquently put it, there are no 
postmodernists at 30,000 feet: “Airplanes built according to scientific prin-
ciples work.  They stay aloft, and they get you to a chosen destination.  
Airplanes built to tribal or mythological specifications, such as the dummy 
planes of the cargo cults in jungle clearings, or the beeswaxed wings of Ica-
rus, don’t.”33  No amount of linguistic disputation will change this basic, 
empirically verifiable fact. 
What makes science such a special enterprise is that its commitment to 
objectivity allows it to be universal.  People of widely different back-
grounds can run the same experiments and see the same results.  Whether 
they are of different races, different political views, or even if they disagree 
strongly on scientific matters, science enables them to communicate their 
ideas and to put their disagreements to the test.  The history of science is 
rich with stories of those whose severe disagreements were put to the test, 
and in which those proven wrong have peacefully and even cheerfully ad-
mitted their errors and moved on to learn more.34  This is because the 
scientific method allows for the testing of theories before an objective stan-
dard—precisely what Postmodernism claims is impossible.  Where the 
Postmodernist envisions minds as locked within their cultural bubbles, un-
able to touch nature, and unable to communicate entirely with one another, 
science envisions minds as basically free, able to learn, and to share with 
and convince others.  As Thomas Huxley famously put it, science is simply 
 
REJECTION OF REASON AND THE NEW POSTMODERN DIVERSITY (Dennis McCallum ed., 1996). 
 32 Daniel C. Dennett, Postmodernism And Truth, (Aug. 13, 1998) (unpublished paper delivered at 
the World Congress of Philosophy), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/postmod.tru.htm. 
(“[There] are truths about events that really happened.  Their denials are falsehoods.  No sane philoso-
pher has ever thought otherwise, though in the heat of battle, they have sometimes made claims that 
could be so interpreted. . . .  In short, the goal of truth goes without saying in every human culture.”).  
See also, THE SOKAL HOAX: THE SHAM THAT SHOOK THE ACADEMY (Lingua Franca eds., 2000) (dra-
matizing Postmodernism’s failings through publication of a hoax paper claiming on Postmodernist me-
thods to prove that gravity is a myth). 
 33 RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN: A DARWINIAN VIEW OF LIFE 31–32 (1995).  But see 
Matt Egan, Nepal Airline Sacrifices Two Goats to Sky God in Face of Aircraft Problems, FOX NEWS, 
Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,295857,00.html  (airline ground crew having 
technical trouble with a Boeing 757 sacrificed goats to appease the Hindu sky god Akash Bhairab). 
 34 KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
293 (Routledge Classics, 2006) (1963) (“The history of science, like the history of all human ideas, is a 
history of irresponsible dreams, of obstinacy, and of error.  But science is one of the very few human 
activities—perhaps the only one—in which the errors are systematically criticized and fairly often, in 
time, corrected.”)  But religion, like taste, is amenable to no test in reality and no objective verification.  
Religious differences cannot be brought to a standard tribunal and settled through experiment.  Science 
requires that differences be settled through persuasion.  Religion does not.  The history of religious vi-
olence attests to the consequences of that difference.  See, e.g.,  JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER 
OF HEAVEN: A STORY OF VIOLENT FAITH (2003); Sherry, supra note 6 at 477–82 (explaining that the 
use of power is the only alternative when reasoned discourse is abandoned, whether by Postmodernism, 
religion, or other doctrines). 
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c and peaceful one, united by a search for objectively ascertaina-
nized common sense: 
Common sense is science exactly in so far as it fulfils [sic] the ideal of common 
sense; that is, sees facts as they are, or, at any rate, without the distortion of pre-
judice, and reasons from them in accordance with the dictates of sound judgment.  
And science is simply common sense at its best; that is, rigidly accurate in obser-
vation, and merciless to fallacy in logic. 
Whoso will question the validity of the conclusions of sound science, must be 
prepared to carry his scepticism [sic] a long way; for it may be safely affirmed, 
that there is hardly any of those decisions of common sense on which men stake 
their all in their practical life, which can justify itself so thoroughly on common 
sense principles, as the broad truths of science can be justified.35 
Postmodernism, it is clear, takes skepticism a very long way—much 
too far for humanity.  To subscribe to it one must concede that the everyday 
facts of reality are merely “language games,”36 and that there is no objec-
tively verifiable reality about the facts which every living person in actual 
practice does take as real.  One is reminded of the famous story of Dr. 
Johnson, who, asked his opinion about Berkeley’s radical subjectivism,
kicked his foot against a stone and cried, “I refute it thus!”37 
“Naturalistic” science is more than simply another “possible ap-
proach[]” to understanding.38  Contrary to the claims of its Postmodernist 
critics, science is a robust and universal system with a code of values which 
we would all do well to emulate.  The society of scientists is a diverse, live-
ly, dynami
ble fact.39 
B.  Avoiding Supernaturalism 
One increasingly common critique is that science’s exclusive focus on 
natural forces—its so-called “methodological naturalism”—is a priori: that 
is, an assumption made at the beginning of the process; an assumption 
which cannot be justified and which unfairly stacks the deck against the 
supernatural.40  The resolution only to look for natural—not supernatural—
                                                          
 35 THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY, THE CRAYFISH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ZOOLOGY 2 
(1880).  Obviously science has come to some conclusions that diverge wildly from common sense—
quantum physics, for example—but these conclusions are just the result of very, very, organized com-
on 
TION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 80 (4th ed. 1997). 
ri_in_the.html (Oct. 3, 2005 08:54 
m sense! 
 36 Trask, supra note 2, at 362. 
 37 JOHN HOSPERS, AN INTRODUC
 38 Trask, supra note 2,  at 364. 
 39 See generally BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES, supra note 1, at 49–76. 
 40 See, e.g., Francis J. Beckwith, Science And Religion Twenty Years after McLean v. Arkansas: 
Evolution, Public Education, And The New Challenge of Intelligent Design, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 455, 457 (2003) (referring to “an a priori philosophical commitment to methodological natural-
ism” allegedly shared by scientists.); Book Note, Not your Daddy’s Fundamentalism: Intelligent Design 
in the Classroom, 117 HARV. L. REV.  964, 966 (2004) (reviewing FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, LAW, 
DARWINISM, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
INTELLIGENT DESIGN (2003)) (referring to “an a priori philosophical commitment to [methodological 
naturalism]” within “evolutionary theory.”)  But see Posting of Brian Leiter to Leiter Reports: A Phi-
losophy Blog, http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2005/10/a_prio
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to focus their attention on natural causes is therefore perfectly 
legit
                                                                                                                                     
causes is simply the prejudice of resolutely closed minds.  This argument is 
helpful to Trask and others who share his view,41 because it helps portray 
science and religion as simply alternative viewpoints which deserve equal 
treatment under the Constitution’s religion clauses.42  But this is false.  
Scientists have at least thre
ation in their research. 
First, and most obviously, science focuses on natural causes instead of 
supernatural ones because by now, experience has demonstrated that this is 
an extremely effective way of doing things.  Generations of scientists have 
made enormous progress on some of humanity’s greatest mysteries, and 
they have done so by seeking out natural causes and putting aside specula-
tions about the supernatural.  This, it must be noted, means that methodo-
logical naturalism is not a priori, but a posteriori.  Science relies on nat
ation because we have discovered that doing so works very well.43 
Second, science seeks natural causes instead of supernatural ones be-
cause supernatural agencies are, by definition, not amenable to scientific 
inquiry.  A supernatural entity—one that operates outside of the course of 
nature, and is not measurable, predictable, or manipulable—cannot be stu-
died by science anyway.  It is reasonable for scientists to confine their ef-
forts to subjects that they can study.  There is no sense in reaching for 
something that is outside of our reach, and a realm of the supernatural is 
simply not something that can be understood in the terms that science uses.  
For scientists 
imate.44 
Finally, forming a “hierarchy of knowledge” requires scientists to 
avoid dropping some inexplicable trick into the chain of knowledge—some 
 
EST) (explaining why methodological naturalism is not a priori.). 
 41 See, e.g., Francis J. Beckwith, Rawls’s Dangerous Idea?: Liberalism, Evolution And The Legal 
Requirement of Religious Neutrality in Public Schools, 20 J.L. & RELIGION 423 (2004–2005). 
 42 Brauer, et al., supra note 3 at 46 (“accus[ing] evolutionary scientists of an a priori commitment 
to [methodological naturalism is an attempt] . . . .  [T]o convince supporters and potential recruits that 
science’s naturalism is arbitrary, lacking foundation in the pragmatic necessities of scientific explana-
tion.  This makes scientists appear dogmatic and conspiratorial, concerned only to keep creationists’ 
putatively competitive explanation of ‘origins’ from assuming its rightful scientific status.  This ap-
proach appeals to Americans’ desire that each side of an issue be heard.”). 
 43 Id. at 48–49 (science “requires no a priori metaphysical commitments.  The only commitment 
is to an empirical methodology, which scientists use with good reason: it works.  Natural explanations 
are scientifically successful; supernatural ones are not.”). 
 44 See Barbara Forrest, Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the 
Connection, 3 PHILO 7 (2000).  Obviously, if another “reality” did exist, which could be measured, pre-
dicted, and evaluated, and which had effects on this world, it would then be a legitimate subject of study 
by scientists.  But then, it would cease to be supernatural or otherworldly!  For example, scientists have 
studied the alleged healing effects of prayer, but their study has been confined only to the (purported) 
natural effects, not to the prayer itself or the Godhead.  See, e.g., Jennifer M. Aviles, et al., Intercessory 
Prayer And Cardiovascular Disease Progression in A Coronary Care Unit Population: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 76 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1192 (2001) (finding no significant effect).  Even if such stu-
dies demonstrated a significant effect, it would prove only the existence of an interesting natural phe-
nomenon, which would then be subsumed under science—but it would prove nothing about a superna-
tural cause of such a phenomenon. 
SANDEFUR_129-154_JAM 2/14/2008 1:28 AM 




i put the point well when asked 
whe me 
                                                          
special “X”-factor which will pretend to connect two halves of a theory to-
gether but which ultimately leaves the mystery unsolved.  Daniel Dennett 
refers to such tricks as “skyhooks,” because they hang from nothing, hold-
ing up a theory without having to touch the ground, as it were.45  A sky-
hook aims to provide an exception to the mechanistic, natural processes 
that connect real phenomena to one another.  It provides a magical spark, or 
deus ex machina, in a system that otherwise would be the simple working 
of mindless forces on mindless entities.  Science avoids 
ooks do no explanatory work, and they tend to swallow up the expla-
natory power of those theories that are well established. 
For example, if a person wants to know how genes control the devel-
opment of an animal, a scientist would explain how the molecules of DNA 
and RNA work—how a gene is transcribed by the ribosome into a protein, 
which then sets in order cellular processes, which in turn control the meta-
bolism and make up the structures of tissues . . . .  Eventually, such an in-
visible hand explanation can connect the most sophisticated processes to 
the most fundamental ideas that science now understands.  But tell a person 
“it’s magic,” and nothing is accomplished: no explanation is provided at 
all.  Magic is an intellectual dead-end, a wall against which questions simp-
ly bounce back.  If a person asks, “How does magic work?” or “Why does 
magic have this result instead of a different result?” the answer is simply, 
because that’s just what magic does.  There just is no deeper answer.46  But 
if magic is an end to the inquiry, why not also use it to “explain” every-
thing else?  The formation and functions of the body work because of the 
(awesomely complicated) mechanical functions of the proteins and amino 
acids—or it’s just magic, and trying to understand magic is, of course, 
pointless.  After all, it’s magic, not boring old comprehensible science!  
Magical “explanations” do just as much work for every phenomenon to 
which they are applied, no matter how complicated—that is to say, none at 
all.  They merely substitute words in place of an explanation.  Like “be-
e I said so,” the statement “it’s just magic” is fundamentally arbitrary 
because it can with equal plausibility apply to any possible state of affairs. 
This point is especially relevant to the evolution controversy.  The 
philosopher of science Jacob Bronowsk
ther evolution didn’t just implausibly suppose that everything ca
 45 DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE 
74–77 (1995). 
 46 This seems to me to be the lesson of the Book of Job, wherein the abused Job finally asks for 
some explanation for his sufferings and is rebuked for daring to question.  Job then repents.  Job 38:2–
42:6.  Cf. Sherry, supra note 6 at 476 (“Because God’s commands need not be rational, logical, or con-
sistent, . . . [reference to] God’s will is essentially a conversation stopper . . . .  If one does not share the 
underlying faith, one is reduced to arguing about whether the believer has properly interpreted God’s 
commands.  That is a sterile argument indeed—focusing on authority rather than morality—and one 
which is particularly unlikely to succeed in the context of any religion that denies individual believers 
the right to dissent from authorized interpretations.”)  There is obviously a big difference between say-
ing that there is no answer and saying that one does not (yet) know the answer, but that it is out there for 
the finding.  Science does the latter all the time. 
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t by mere accident: 
On the contrary, it is those who appeal to God and special creation who reduce 
everything to an accident.  They assign to man a unique status on the ground that 
there was some act of special creation which made the world the way it is.  But 
that explains nothing, because it would explain anything: it is an explanation for 
any conceivable world.  If we had the color vision of the bee combined with the 
neck of the giraffe and the feet of the elephant, that would equally be explained 
by the “theory” of special creation.47 
Magical “explanations” therefore teach nothing—yet consider Trask’s 
statement that “exclusion of supernatural theories from science classes 
marginalizes religious belief.”48  If the implication here is that supernatural 
“theories” ought to be included in science lessons, one can only imagine 
what science classes would be like.  In addition to thoroughly documented, 
well-substantiated scientific propositions, teachers would be compelled to 
list—non-judgmentally—the many varieties of (often conflicting) superna-
tural propositions from every religion, major and minor, each of which 
lacks evidentiary support or even the potential for such support.  If the 
teacher explains that earthquakes are caused by the motions of the Earth’s 
tectonic plates, he would then be required to explain that there are equally 
legitimate notions that they are caused by Poseidon becoming angry at the 
moral transgressions of sailors,49 or the laughter of the Egyptian god Geb,50 
and that no mere empirical evidence for or against these propositions is 
available or possible, because these are just different ways of knowing, and 
it’s up to the children to decide what to believe.  In the end, s
these “supernatural explan
things: appeals to the supernatural are not explanations at all. 
C.  Is Science A Religion? 
Another essential point for Trask is the argument that science is part 
of a “religion” of “secular humanism” which has gained unfair advantages 
with the public, and particularly in classrooms.  This “religion,” Trask 
claims, “emerge[s] logically and necessarily from the materialist scienti ic
od.”52  Teaching science, therefore, and particularly evolution, is a 
form of “forcibl[e] indoctrinat[ion]” in the religion of secular humanism.53 
 47 George Derfer, Science, Poetry and “Human Specificity”: An Interview with J. Bronowski, 43 
AM. SCHOLAR 386, 399–400 (1974).  See also CARL ZIMMER, EVOLUTION: THE TRIUMPH OF AN IDEA 
332 (2002) (quoting Richard Dawkins: “If you’re allowed just to postulate something complicated 
enough to design a universe intelligently. . . .  [y]ou’ve simply allowed yourself to assume the existence 
of exactly the thing which we’re trying to explain . . .  You’re simply not providing any kind of expla-
nation at all.”). 
 48 Trask, supra note 2, at 382. 
 49 HOMER, ODYSSEY reprinted in CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY: IMAGES & INSIGHTS 469, 470–71 
(Stephen L. Harris & Gloria Platzner eds., Stanley Lombardo trans., McGraw-Hill, 4th ed. 1995). 
 50 GEORGE HART, THE ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF EGYPTIAN GODS AND GODDESSES 59 (2d 
ed. 2005). 
 51 Trask, supra note 2, at 364. 
 52 Id. at 365–66. 
 53 Id. at 365. 
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their own proof and cannot be denied without being simultaneously relied 
upon.58  Science establishes its propositions by experimental confirmation 
To begin with, this claim commits the fallacy of affirming the conse-
quent.  Assuming it is true that secular humanism is a religion, and that 
evolution or other scientific theories are a part of that religion, it still would 
not follow that teaching these scientific theories would constitute forbidden 
indoctrination.  Many
ome54—are subsumed under religious doctrines, but they are not there-
fore religious claims. 
More to the point, Trask contends that science “requires as much faith 
as belief in the supernatural.”55  He bases this claim on the assertions that 
for science to legitimize itself would be circular reasoning, because the 
precepts to which such a justification would appeal are themselves the con-
structs of secular, scientific society,56 and also that “science 
gh the senses alone that all true knowledge must be directly accessible 
to the senses,” since trying to do so would beg the question.57 
The latter charge can be dealt with quickly: scientists do not claim that 
all true knowledge must be accessible through the senses, but merely that 
scientific knowledge must be accessible through the senses.  Nor does 
science claim that all true knowledge can be understood through the scien-
tific method; it claims merely that all scientific understanding must be 
based on empirical evidence and processed by reason.  Realist philosophers 
do hold that all valid knowledge must be in some way reducible to sense 
experience, but they do not hold that all knowledge must directly accessi-
ble to the senses.  Mathematics, for example, is not directly accessible to 
the senses.  But for such knowledge to be of any use to humans, it m
nstrable in a way that can be confirmed by some sort of sensory expe-
rience, if for no other reason than that it can then be taught to others. 
A more complicated issue is the oft-heard claim that all knowledge 
has a foundation in faith because, although we may establish thorough, log-
ically sound constructs, our basic assumptions must always be mere as-
sumptions: for example, sophisticated chains of reasoning still make the 
“leap of faith” that sensory data are reliable.  This argument is wrong, since 
it confuses assumptions with axioms.  Axiomatic knowledge is not taken 
on faith, or merely assumed; rather, axioms are propositions that contain 
                                                          
 54 But not at the time when Cyrenus ruled Syria and Herod I ruled Judea.  Compare Luke 1:5, 
2:1–2 (asserting that Augustus, Cyrenius, and Herod I ruled at the same time) with ROBIN LANE FOX, 
THE UNAUTHORIZED VERSION: TRUTH AND FICTION IN THE BIBLE 28 (1991) (noting that Cyrenius 
until a decade or so after the death of Herod.). 
suadere malorum.”  LUCRETIUS, DE RERUM NATURA 
rev. 1966). 
andom House, 1941); Tibor Machan, Evidence of Necessary Exis-
(Quirinus) was not governor of Syria 
 55 Trask, supra note 2, at 363. 
 56 Id.  In other words, scientists defending their work on the grounds that their discoveries are 
supported by the evidence are just begging the question because the value of evidence is merely one of 
science’s assumptions!  “Tantum religio potuit 
1:101 (W. H. D. Rouse trans., 3d ed. 
 57 Trask, supra note 2, at 363. 
 58 See generally ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics bk IV ch. 3–4, in, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 
735–43 (Richard McKeon, ed., R
SANDEFUR_129-154_JAM 2/14/2008 1:28 AM 
2007] Reason and Common Ground 141 
                                                                                                                                     
using perceptual data59 which are themselves the irreducible, non-arbitrary 
foundation of cognition.60  A similarly common contention is that science 
must assume—with apparent arbitrariness—the validity of induction: a 
scientist is merely guessing that because the sun has risen countless times, 
it will rise again in the morning.  This is really just an assumption, not a 
logical necessity, so the chain of reason is said to collapse here.  This too, 
is incorrect.  Induction is a process of grasping the similarities and differ-
ences in causal relationships and forming a complete conceptual under-
standing.61  Moreover, the whole point of the experimental method, as op-
posed to mere contemplation, is that it has a healthy relationship with 
inductive reasoning, since experimentation alone allows us to test the ve-
racity of our inferences.  Since inference is typical in human thinking, 
science provides us with a uniquely effective way to weed out bad induc-
tion from good: formulation of hypotheses, testing with empirically verifi-
able results, and then refinement or rejection of invalid inferences. This is 
the exact opposite of faith or guesswork. 
As to Trask’s claim that science cannot legitimize itself except 
through circular reasoning, it is difficult to refute on the Postmodernist 
premise that science is just a “language game.”62  But it is not—it is a pur-
suit that proposes and accomplishes actual results in the real world.  This 
alone legitimizes science as an epistemological matter.  Contrary to Trask’s 
claim that science has no “superior claim to proof”63 over supernaturalism, 
the predictive power of the modern world’s rigorous scientific theories do 
indeed establish their superiority over supernaturalism.  In 1967, a crowd of 
Vietnam War protestors led by Abbie Hoffman tried to use chanting and 
meditation to cause the Pentagon to levitate off the ground.  Needless to 
say, this attempt failed.  Two years later, NASA scientists put two men on 
the surface of the moon, using equations and experimentally tested theories 
tracing back to Sir Isaac Newton.64  Science has a superior claim to legiti-
 
nce
t sensory data are taken on faith, however; just that they are corrected against 
bser
4); DAVID KELLEY, THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES: A REALIST THEORY OF 
ERC
id Harriman, Induction And Experimental Method, 2 THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 73, 
00–
a note 2 at 362. 
N OF THE PRIMITIVE: THE ANTI-
te , 1 OBJECTIVITY 31 (1992). 
 59 Of course, we can err in interpreting our perceptions, and some people’s perceptual apparatus 
might not function properly.  This is why science requires intersubjectively accessible data.  In this 
connection, what Coke said of the common law is true also of science, that it is “nothing else but rea-
son, which is to be understood of an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, 
and experience, and not of every man’s naturall [sic] reason.”  EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *97b (William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1600–1615).  This fact does 
not mean, however, tha
o vations by others. 
 60 This is a complicated subject, far beyond the scope of this paper, and one on which scientists 
themselves differ.  For in-depth discussions of the view (that I share) that the chain of reason need not 
be hooked to an arbitrarily assumed base, see AYN RAND, INTRODUCTION TO OBJECTIVIST 
EPISTEMOLOGY (Harry Binswanger & Leonard Peikoff eds., rev. 2d. ed., Meridian 1966); TIBOR R. 
MACHAN, OBJECTIVITY: RECOVERING DETERMINATE REALITY IN PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND 
EVERYDAY LIFE (200
P EPTION (1986). 
 61 See Dav
1 07 (2007). 
 62 Trask, supr
 63 Id. at 364. 
 64 See AYN RAND, Apollo And Dionysus, in THE RETUR
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macy if for no other reason than that its techniques enable us to predict re-
sults and accomplish our ends on such a spectacular scale. 
For a similar reason, science is “good.”  There is a sense in which it is 
true that science—understood in the modern sense as a specific kind of re-
search—cannot vouch for its own worth.  If science is a worthy undertak-
ing for human beings, it must fit into a hierarchy of values—of “goods” for 
human beings.  That is, it must be justified in terms of its service of certain 
ends.  The ends which science serves—the “relief of man’s estate”—are 
good ends because for human beings there simply cannot be any other de-
finition of goodness than the flourishing of human beings.65  There is no 
circularity in justifying science on these grounds: it is validated by its ser-
vice of man’s needs.  And once again, naturalistic science passes this test 
spectacularly.  Trask approvingly quotes the Postmodernist Jean-François 
Lyotard, who writes that “there is no other proof that the rules [of science] 
are good than the consensus extended to them by the experts,”66 but this is 
absurd: the proof that the rules of science are good are the smallpox vac-
cine, heart bypass surgery, jet aircraft, Apollo 11, and golden rice.67  And 
these things, in turn, are good because they are good for man. 
Science is not a religion.  Although the word “religion” is notoriously 
difficult to define,68 it is at least clear that it includes some reference to su-
pernatural or transcendental forces that possess volition.  In United States v. 
Meyers,69 the court rejected the argument of a litigant who claimed to be a 
member of the “church of marijuana,” and provided a remarkably good de-
finition of religion.  Among other things, religions generally include refer-
ence to “fundamental questions about life, purpose, and death,” “address a 
reality which transcends the physical and immediately apparent world,” are 
usually “founded or significantly influenced by a deity, teacher, seer, or 
prophet who is considered to be divine, enlightened, gifted, or blessed,” 
“designate particular structures or places as sacred, holy, or significant,” 
include a “clergy . . . [who] are keepers and purveyors of religious know-
 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 99 (Peter Schwartz ed., Meridian 1999). 
 65  TARA SMITH, VIABLE VALUES 125–45 (2000).  Smith states that “[f]lourishing refers to a life 
that is prospering or in good condition” and that “what makes a life good is its being led in a life-
furthering fashion.”  Id. at 126–27. 
 66 Trask, supra note 2, at 368 (quoting JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN 
CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 29 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Min-
nesota Press 1984) (1979). 
 67 Of course, science has also brought us fearful things such as nuclear weapons.  Nevertheless, 
science has alleviated far more human suffering than it has caused.  J. BRONOWSKI, THE COMMON 
SENSE OF SCIENCE 146–47 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1978) (1951). 
 68 See, e.g., Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978); 
Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
233 (1989); Ben Clements, Note, Defining “Religion” in The First Amendment: A Functional Ap-
proach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532 (1989); Andrew W. Austin, Faith And The Constitutional Definition 
of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1991–1992); Recent Case: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
Invalidates Religious Holiday Statute Protecting Only Established Religions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 541 
(1996). 
 69 906 F.Supp. 1494 (D.Wyo. 1995), aff’d 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996). 
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ledge,” and “include some form of ceremony, ritual, liturgy, sacrament, or 
protocol . . . imbued with transcendent significance.”70  These things are 
not true of science.  To define science as a religion would require one to 
stretch the definition of “religion” too far, so that every form of belief, from 
the Boy Scout Oath to the platform of the Democratic Party to the beliefs 
of the most rigorous atheist, would also be a religion.71  Such a definition is 
unworkable, and, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, “patent-
ly frivolous.”72  Indeed, such a definition of religion “cannot be found in 
the dictionary, in the Supreme 
understanding of the words.”73 
ll Epistemologies Are Not Created Equal 
As Matthew J. Brauer, Barbara Forrest, and Steven G. Gey conclude 
in Is It Science Yet?  (the definitive law review article on contemporary cr-
eationism74), science’s focus on natural causation rather than supernatural 
                            
er sufficiently concrete and particularized to support 
 organizations. Its program bears the words 
he ghest is Holy Ground.’”). 
.3d at 520. 
s he makes).  No discussion of the evolution controversy is com-
 70 Id. at 1502–03. 
 71 It is true that the Supreme Court, in a footnote in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 
(1961), identified “secular humanism” as one of the “religions” to which the First Amendment applies.  
But this footnote—dictum in that case—is not as conclusive as some writers contend.  It, and the cases 
it cited on this point—Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 
1957) and Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal.App.2d 673 (1957)—did not address 
Establishment Clause issues, and did not hold that “humanism” (whatever that term might designate) is 
a religion for Establishment Clause purposes.  See Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(“The Court’s statement in Torcaso does not stand for the proposition that humanism, no matter in what 
form and no matter how practiced, amounts to a religion under the First Amendment.”).  See also Pelo-
za v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517,  521 (9th Cir. 1994) (“neither the Supreme Court, nor 
this circuit, has ever held that evolutionism or secular humanism are ‘religions’ for Establishment 
Clause purposes.”).  This difference is important because the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
cover different issues.  See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 n.4 (2002) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
246–57 (1998).  What might be a protected individual right under the Free Exercise Clause—the right 
to subscribe to and practice a particular philosophical position—may not be barred to the government 
under the Establishment Clause.  Take, for example, the faith of the World Church of the Creator, a 
white supremacist group that believes God created white people superior to black people.  While the 
government is barred from obstructing the free exercise of such beliefs by the church’s members, it is 
not barred from declaring officially that whites and blacks are created equal, even though its doing so 
may offend members of the church.  See generally Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 
127 S.Ct. 2553, 2582 (2007) (plurality) (“Is a taxpayer’s purely psychological displeasure that his funds 
are being spent in an allegedly unlawful manner ev
Article III standing?  The answer is plainly no.”).   
In addition, the two cases cited by Torcaso involved humanist groups which sought tax exemptions that 
had been provided for religious organizations.  Those two cases only addressed the question of whether 
belief in a “supreme being” was the sine qua non of “religion.”  The groups in question engaged in 
many ceremonial and ritualistic practices that echoed traditional religious observances, which cannot be 
said of scientists or of most secular humanists.  It appears that the religious group involved in Washing-
ton Ethical Society, in particular, were mystical or semi-mystical, and therefore that its characterization 
as “secular” is open to doubt.  See 249 F.2d at 128 (“The services of the organization held at regular 
hours each Sunday have the forms of worship service with Bible readings, sermons, singing and medita-
tion familiar in services of many formal or traditional church
‘W re Men Meet to Seek the Hi
 72 Peloza, 37 F
 73 Id. at 521. 
 74 Brauer et al., supra note 3.  It is inexplicable that Trask fails to cite this article, (or any other 
work which responds to the argument
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eatment of secular and supernatural beliefs might run 
alon
ly an object of historical study concerning some de-
causation “has nothing to do with a crass desire for explanatory (or politi-
cal) hegemony.  Scientists exclude the supernatural because they are unable 
to construct explanations that require access to a reality beyond the cogni-
tive faculties and sources of knowledge humans are known to have.”75  The 
argument by Trask, Philip Johnson76, and others, that science excludes the 
possibility of supernaturalism in order to bar religion at the door is a misre-
presentation.  And, contrary to Trask’s contention that science’s success 
unfairly excludes religious belief from the marketplace of ideas, there is 
good reason that science has prevailed: it works.  It was scientific research 
and experiment that cured smallpox, and not the fruitless efforts of count-
less m
Trask’s Postmodern notion that all epistemologies are created equal is 
belied by the common experience of mankind and by the very nature of 
knowledge.  We can see the point clearly by simply rewriting a paragraph 
of Trask’s article to refer to a specific supernatural belief.  The ancient 
Greeks thought that the winter cold was caused by Persephone’s visit to her 
husband Hades, the god of the underworld.77  Modern astronomy has re-
vealed that the seasons are caused by the tilt of Earth’s axis.  But the de-
mand for equal tr
g these lines: 
The exclusive teaching of [the idea that the seasons are caused by the tilt of 
Earth’s axis] in public schools is an advancement of the religion of secular hu-
manism.  There is an inherent connection between [scientific astronomy] and the 
secular humanist worldview.  Secular humanists generally reject knowledge that 
science cannot test [such as that Persephone’s visit to the underworld causes the 
seasons].  Since one cannot directly test the supernatural, secular humanists in-
evitably adopt a naturalistic worldview, which is the belief that there is only a 
natural realm and no supernatural.  Any secular humanist theory about the [cause 
of the seasons] cannot rely on the supernatural because that would be inconsis-
tent with naturalism.  Therefore, there is an inherent link between secular human-
ism and [astronomy] because [astronomy] is an exclusively materialistic theory 
about the origin of [the seasons]. . . . [T]he exclusion of supernatural theories 
from science classes marginalizes religious belief.  It creates the impression that 
secular humanism is a practical device that allows people to understand the world 
today, and religion is on  
ranged people of the past.78 
The absurdity makes the point clear: the reason supernatural “theo-
ries” are not a serious part of scientific discourse is that they have not fit 
the facts and have not yielded useful conclusions.  Does Trask really be-
                                                                                                                                      
plete without reference to this paper. 
 75 Id. at 50. 
 76 Phillip E. Johnson, Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 
1990, available at http://www.arn.org/docs/johnson/pjdogma1.htm. 
 77 See HOMERIC HYMN TO DEMETER, reprinted in, CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY, supra note 49, at 
164–74. 
 78 Trask, supra note 2, at 381–83. 
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lieve such “theories” as Greek mythology ought to be accorded the same 
respect as our modern understanding of the causes of the seasons?  After 
all, to call the Persephone myth a “myth” would denigrate it and make it 
seem deranged—because, of course, it is, by our standards.  The Perse-
phone myth is simply not true.  For those who believe that “truth” is some-
thing more than a cultural prejudice, this is a convincing reason to exclude 
the Persephone myth from laboratories and science classes.  Taken to its 
logical conclusion, Trask’s argument would require science teachers to in-
clude in their lessons a potentially infinite number of u
79 as well as astrology, phrenology, heliocentrism, the flatness of the 
earth, and the immortality of the Count of St. Germain. 
It is precisely because science is not a religion—that it focuses on em-
pirically verifiable facts—that it is accessible to people of diverse back-
grounds and is capable of getting them to change their minds.  A person 
who insists on the truth of the Persephone myth, a belief amenable to no 
test in reality, cannot be shaken of that notion.  But the person who holds a 
false belief while accepting empirical verification and experiment as a test 
of truth, can look at the evidence, do the experiments, and see where she 
has erred.  As Suzanna Sherry notes, rational discourse becomes impossible 
in the absence of such an agreement on objective testing: “[a]necdotal evi-
dence replaces scientific data, and telling stories becomes the equivalent of 
making rational arguments.  Thus, what people say beco
hat they can ‘prove,’. . . . Once the commonality of reason is rejected, 
knowledge is intensely personal . . . .”80 
Science and supernaturalism are simply not equally valid ways of un-
derstanding the world.  Science, with its commitment to exclusively natural 
explanations, has proven itself with practical results, highly reliable predic-
tions, a consistent and robust system of knowledge, an intricately integrated 
network of theory, and a universal
 diverse population.  If any culture can lay claim to universal 
 the culture of science. 
II.  THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND NEUTRALITY 
Nothing in the Constitution requires government to remain “neutral” 
between naturalistic and supernatural worldviews.  The only restriction that 
the Constitution places on government’s relationship to supernaturalism 
 79 I strongly suspect that Trask would not—as consistency would require of him—hold that the 
government should teach every religious view equally.  Instead, I suspect he shares Justice Scalia’s 
view that the Constitution “permits . . . disregard of polytheists and . . . devout atheists” since “[t]he 
three most popular religions in the United States, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—which combined 
account for 97.7% of all believers—are monotheistic.” McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civ. Liberties 
Union of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2753, (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  This, of course, in the words of 
James Madison, “is to lift the evil at once and exhibit in its naked deformity the doctrine that religious 
truth is to be tested by numbers, or that the major sects have a right to govern the minor.”  JAMES 
MADISON, Detatched Memoranda, in  JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 745, 763 (J. Rakove ed. 1999). 
 80 Sherry, supra note 6, at 459. 
SANDEFUR_129-154_JAM 2/14/2008 1:28 AM 
146 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:129 






ent, because it is 
base
                                                          
appears in the First Amendment, which forbids government from “estab-
lishing” a religion or from interfering with those who wish to “exercise” 
their religions.  In Epperson v. Arkansas,81 the Supreme Court held that 
“The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion 
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion,”82 but Trask and other 
writers have pulled th
 not endorse or base its policies on scientific, natural explanations of 
the physical world.83 
This is obviously a misreading of the First Amendment.  If govern-
ment were truly required to remain neutral between “naturalism” and “su-
pernaturalism,” it would be impossible for it to accomplish anything with-
out making a potentially infinite number of paralyzing accommodations.  
For example, it would be unable to teach children that AIDS is caused by a 
virus, unless it provided equal time for those who believe that it is God’s 
punishment for the sin of sodomy.84  It would not be allowed to prevent the 
abuse of women and children among communities that hold women to be 
second-class citizens and children the “property” of their parents, subject to 
“honor killings” and genital mutilation.  And if a city happens to have any 
citizens with Aztec roots, it had better take care not to con
h on fire hazards without also appeasing the fire god Huehueteotl, 
who liked to have newlywed couples sacrificed to Him.85 
This may sound flippant, but the reality is quite serious indeed.  In Ju-
ly, 2007, police in Phoenix, Arizona responded to a domestic disturbance to 
discover 48-year old Ronald Marquez in the act of choking his three-year-
old granddaughter to death.  Looking on was the baby’s 19-year-old moth-
er, naked and covered in blood.  Marquez was performing an exorcism, t
o expel demons from the infant by strangling the life out of her.  Police 
officers saved her life by tasering the man (who died from the shock).86 
A nation in which the First Amendment prohibits the government 
from “adopt[ing] a distinctly materialistic belief. . .that directly conflicts 
with other religious beliefs”87 is one in which the police officers would be 
prohibited from saving this little girl’s life.  After all, their doing so certain-
ly “marginalized” the grandfather’s religious beliefs.  Who are the police to 
say that the child was not suffering from demonic possession?  To suggest 
that natural, scientific causes can account for whatever illness the child 
may have had is no answer, according to Trask’s argum
d on an epistemology that is unfairly biased against supernaturalism.  
 81 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 82 Id. at 104. 
 83 Trask, supra note 2 at 371;  Contra McRoberts & Sandefur, supra note 3, at 39–47 (responding 
to the “neutrality” argument). 
 84 Cf. Sherry, supra note 6, at 482–83. 
 85 MARY MILLER & KARL TAUBE, AN ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF THE GODS AND SYMBOLS 
OF ANCIENT MEXICO AND THE MAYA 92 (1993). 
 86 Elias C. Arnold, Fatal End to Exorcism Attempt, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 29, 2007, at A8. 
 87 Trask, supra note 2 at 386. 
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Indeed, it would be a cruel form of cultural imperialism. 
Trask’s argument is clearly nonsense.  A society which consistently 
prohibited its government from preferring secular reasoning over su
turalism would be paralyzed.  Moreover, the Constitution clearly contem-
plates a government which shall base its actions on secular reasons. 
A.  Consistent “Neutrality” Between World Views Would Be Unworkable 
In Employment Division v. Smith,88 the Supreme Court held that a per-
son’s religious beliefs cannot absolve him of obeying laws which are de-
signed for a general, secular purpose.  There, a religious group contended 
that a federal law against the use of hallucinogens violated their Free Exer-
cise rights, since their religious ceremonies included the use of such drugs.  
The Court explained that that theory would grant religious believers a kind 
of heckler’s veto over legitimate enactments.  “Any society” which ex-
empted people from laws whenever such people claimed a supernatural 
reason for such an exemption “would be courting anarchy,” particularly 
given America’s “diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to 
coerce or suppress none of them.  Precisely because ‘we are a cosmopolitan 
nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious prefe-
rence,’ and precisely because we value and protect that religious diver-
gence, we cannot afford [that] luxury.”89  The argument that the First 
Amendment prohibits the government from any action which restricts a 
person’s obedience to alleged supernatural revelation “would open the
prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obli-
gations of almost every conceivable kind. . . .”90 
This conclusion is certainly true.  As the Court noted, there are an in-
definite number of religious claims purporting to exempt a person from the 
demands of a modern secular culture.  Litigants have demanded religious 
exemptions for everything from school attendance laws91 to laws requiring 
children to be vaccinated.92  In one case, a group of prisoners claimed to 
have founded a religion which required them to be fed steak and wine at 
each meal!93  Because supernatural claims have no test in reality, they can 
stop rational discourse and rational policies in their tracks.  The First
Amendment does not go so far.  In fact, government is free to base its poli-
cies on secular considerations and to choose good science over bad.94 
 88 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 89 Id. at 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 92 Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964). 
 93 Theriault v. Silber, 391 F. Supp. 578, 582 (W.D. Tex. 1975), vacated, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
 94 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding Massachusetts legislature’s 
decision to require vaccinations despite some scientific skepticism about the efficacy of vaccinations); 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 n.18 (3d Cir. 1985) (taking judicial notice “of the inva-
lidity of . . . astrology or phrenology.”). 
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Moreover, government is free to promote sound science, by subsidiz-
ing its publication by private parties or by teaching it directly.  This is un-
surprising, since government is free to promote sound history, and other 
subjects.  When one concedes that government may teach people about 
World War II—whether through government schools, or monuments, or 
other ways—one must concede that it may also teach them accurately that, 
for instance, it may teach about the Holocaust, despite the fact that there are 
people who deny that it occurred.  When one concedes that government 
may teach students geography, one must also concede that it may teach 
them that the world is round, even though there are people who do not be-
lieve this.95  If one concedes that the government has the right to give 
grants to private organizations that teach science, including science which 
some people c
ede that government may choose to give grants to private organiza-
tions that make accurate statements about both the science and the religious 
controversy.96 
In Crowley v Smithsonian Institution,97 the plaintiffs challenged the 
Smithsonian’s use of government funds to set up an exhibit on evolution, 
arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause.  The exhibit, they 
claimed, promoted what they called the “religion” of secular humanism.98  
Seeking to “balance [the] appellants’ freedom to practice and propagate 
their religious beliefs in creation without suffering government competition 
or interferences and [the Smithsonian’s] right to disseminate, and the pub-
lic’s right to receive, knowledge from government,” the court concluded 
that the “balance was long ago struck in favor of diffusion of knowledge 
based on responsible scientific foundations, and against special constitu-
tional protection of religious believers from the competition generated by 
such knowledge diffusion.”99  It noted that the “solid secu
reasing and diffusing knowledge among men’”100 was sufficien
it the expenditure of federal funds despite the fact that some peo
ht interpret the display as having religious connotations: 
Nor does it follow that government involvement in a subject which is also impor-
tant to practitioners of a religion becomes, therefore, activity in support of reli-
gion.  For example, birth control and abortion are topics that involve both reli-
gious beliefs and general health and welfare concerns.  Many religious leaders 
have vigorously opposed government support of the teaching and practice of 
birth control and government support, or even toleration, of abortion.  Controver-
 95 Robert P.J. Day, Documenting the existence of the “International Flat Earth Society,” 
http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/flatearth.html (visited Sept. 29, 2007). 
 96 But see Francis Beckwith, Government-Sponsored Theology, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, 
Apr. 7, 2004, http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=6395 (last visited Aug. 13, 2007) (ar-
guing that Establishment Clause was violated when government-funded National Science Foundation 
gave grant to U.C. Berkeley to establish website on evolution.). 
 97 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 98 Id. at 740. 
 99 Id. at 744. 
 100 Id. at 740 (citation omitted). 
SANDEFUR_129-154_JAM 2/14/2008 1:28 AM 
2007] Reason and Common Ground 149 
gation, about these subjects has been prolific and spirited.  No 
eaning of “establishment” is a matter of 
constant dispute, it simply cannot be so broadly defined as to include the 
adoption of policies based on secular criteria, if the government is to have 
the capacity to act on any matter. 
                                                          
sy, including liti
court, however, has finally held that government advocacy of or opposition to ei-
ther birth control or abortion violates the establishment clause of the first 
amendment.101 
Trask objects to Crowley on the grounds that what he calls “evolution-
ism,”102 is “a religion because it takes a position on an issue that has always 
been at the center of religious belief systems, i.e., the origin of life and the 
universe.”103  Thus, for the government to endorse it is a violation of con-
stitutionally mandated neutrality.  But nothing in the Constitution forbids 
the government from taking positions on “matters” that are “addressed” by 
religions.  “We recognized that when the government appropriates public 
funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it 
wishes.”104  It may subsidize the pork industry and advertisements for pork 
even though religious scriptures take positions on the consumption of 
pork.105  The government may urge people to practice safe sex even though 
doing so conflicts with certain religious views,106 just as it may urge people 
not to obtain abortions.107  In fact, the government may express “its” opi-
nions in virtually any matter, regardless of the fact that there are some who 
would have religious objections to the messages in question.  This is be-
cause “the antidisparagement principle [can] effectively silence the gov-
ernment on a great many matters to which the citizenry has some form of 
deep attachment.”108  The only limitation on the messages which govern-
ment may convey is that it may not “establish” a religious dogma in an 
official sense.  While the exact m
 101 Id. at 742 (citations omitted). See also Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 
(1st Cir. 1995); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F.Supp. 340 (D.C. Md. 1969), aff’d, 428 F.2d 471 
(4th Cir. 1970); Civic Awareness of Am., Ltd. v. Richardson, 343 F.Supp. 1358 (E.D. Wis. 1972); 
Smith v. Ricci, 446 A.2d 501 (N.J. 1982); Gregory G. Sarno and Alan Stephens, Annotation, Constitu-
tionality of Teaching or Otherwise Promoting Secular Humanism in Public Schools, 103 A.L.R. FED. 
538 (2005). 
 102 “Evolutionism” is commonly used as a value-laden term to imply that the scientific fact of evo-
lution is an ideology.  In fact, schools do not teach “evolutionism” any more than they teach “econo-
micsism” or “historyism.”  See Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 520–21 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
 103 Trask, supra note 2, at 386.  Some scientists have contended that evolution takes no position on 
the origin of life, merely the development of life after it originated.  See, e.g., McLean v. Ark. Bd. of 
Ed., 529 F.Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (“Although the subject of origins of life is within the 
province of biology, the scientific community does not consider origins of life a part of evolutionary 
theory.”).  I disagree.  Evolution is as useful in the search for the origin of what we call life as it is in 
describing the origin of species.  See DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA, supra note 45, at 149–
85. 
 104 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
 105 Cf. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055  (2005). 
 106 Cf. Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684, 691 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 107 Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991). 
 108 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Limits of Equal Liberty as a Theory of Religious Free-
dom, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1253 (2007). 
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B. Nothing In The Constitution Forbids A Commitment To 
Methodological Naturalism 
The text of the Constitution clearly anticipates government acting on 
secular criteria.  For example, Congress is given power to grant copyrights 
and patents in order to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts—secular criteria.109  Defendants may not be convicted of treason ex-
cept on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act—not only se-
cular criteria, but empirical, secular criteria.110  Juries are generally ex-
pected to convict on the basis of evidence, rather than on appeals to non-
evidentiary matters such as faith.111  Moreover, a government given the 
power to do X must be able to do X effectively.112  If, as is the case, the 
most effective method of accomplishing its purposes is to rely on the scien-
tific method and the data of naturalistic science, this alone is a sufficient, 
religiously-neutral justification for basing policy on science and not on su-
pernaturalism.  The framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights clear-
ly anticipated that government would act on the basis of secular considera-
tions, empirical data, and reason. 
There is nothing in the Constitution’s text or history that suggests that 
the founders considered “materialistic science” to be a “religion” covered 
by the First Amendment.  Indeed, a great many of America’s founders were 
themselves scientists who believed strongly in empiricism and the search 
for the material causes of phenomena.113  After hundreds of generations of 
humans had clung to a “supernatural theory” of lightning—that it was the 
weapon of Zeus, the spear of Odin, the weapon of Vajra—Constitution-
signer Benjamin Franklin accounted for it through a natural, empirical ex-
planation that allowed people to protect their buildings from lightning via 
the lightning rod.  His contemporaries generally agreed that a true under-
standing of the world not only was possible through empirical research, but 
that such an understanding was to be applauded and encouraged, often by 
government subsidies.114  There is no evidence that Franklin or his con-
 109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 110  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
 111 PENNOCK, supra note 28, at 295 (“Imagine the problems that would result if the courts had to 
accept legal theories of this sort.  How would the court rule on whether to commit a purportedly insane 
person to a mental hospital for self-mutilation who claims that the Lord told her to pluck out her eye 
because it offended her?  How would a judge deal with a defendant, Abe, accused of attempted murder 
of his son, Ike, who claims that he was only following God’s command that he kill Ike to prove his 
faith?”). 
 112 Cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324–25 (1819) (“the grant of powers itself 
necessarily implies the grant of all usual and suitable means for the execution of the powers 
granted . . . [including] such powers as are suitable and fitted to the object; such as are best and most 
useful in relation to the end proposed.”). 
 113 See, e.g., I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON (1997). 
 114 Thomas Jefferson, a skeptic and freethinker, was behind such government-subsidized scientific 
undertakings as the Lewis and Clark expedition.  See generally EDWIN T. MARTIN, THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: SCIENTIST (1952).  James Madison, author of the First Amendment, advocated establishing 
a federally-funded university “in which no preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account of 
religion,” 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 616 (Max Farrand ed., Plimpton Press 
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temporaries understood the word “religion” to include scientific empiric-
ism:115 instead, the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses were unders-
tood as barring the state from compelling attendance to or support of an in-
stitution demanding spiritual allegiance to a dogmatic creed, and 
prohibiting the state from interfering with an individual’s obedience to the 
demands of the creed that he had freely accepted.116 
There are certainly instances where government’s secular policies 
overlap the zone of religious freedom that is guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, and where the enactment of such policies can intrude on the deeply 
held beliefs of religious practitioners.  These are the hard cases in First 
Amendment law.  But the closest the Supreme Court has ever come to 
holding that “neutrality” between religious sects bars the government from 
pursuing legitimate, secular policies, is United States v. Ballard.117  There, 
a 5–4 Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a defendant in a mail-
fraud case who had been brought up on charges due to a faith-healing 
scheme.  Justice Douglas declared for the majority that “the truth or verity 
of respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs” should not have been consi-
dered by the trial court.118  For a court to convict a person of fraud on the 
basis that his religious doctrines were false would threaten the safety of re-
ligious dissenters.  People “may not be put to the proof of their religious 
doctrines or beliefs.”119  The fact that religious dogmas are 
[B]eyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before 
the law. . . .  The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after 
death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many.  If one 
could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teach-
ings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.120 
                                                                                                                                      
1923) (1911), as did Benjamin Rush, devout Christian, signer of the Declaration of Independence, and 
pioneering physician and science enthusiast.  ALYN BRODSKY, BENJAMIN RUSH: PATRIOT AND 
HY
in the minds of thinkers in the 
found
refore 
 threescore and ten differs from eternity. 
EN
, ed., 1984) 
is ious opinions” from “our opinions in physics or geometry.”). 
8 (1944). 
t 86. 
P SICIAN 295 (2004). 
 115 One indication of the distinction between religion and science 
ing era appears in the first edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica: 
We know but little of the nature of bodies; we discover some of their properties, as motion, 
figure, colours, &c. but of their essence we are ignorant: we know still much less of the 
soul, but of the essence or nature of God, we know nothing. . . .  [W]e may discover his 
attributes by our reason, almost as clearly as we distinguish the properties of matter, and 
many other objects: and this knowledge is sufficient for us.  The end of every other science 
is some temporal happiness; theology alone proposes an eternal felicity; its object the
differs from all other sciences, as the age of
3 CYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 533 (1771). 
 116 See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Memorial And Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 
(1785), reprinted in MADISON: WRITINGS 29, 30 (Jack N. Rakove, ed. 1999) (defining religion as “the 
duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it”); THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom, in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 346, 346–47  (Merril D. Peterson
(d tinguishing between “relig
 117 322 U.S. 7
 118 Id. a
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 87. 
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 preference for scientific understandings, but which is expected to do 
C.  T
Ballard is a hard case, especially after Smith,121 but it is at least clear 
that Ballard does not apply to government policies based on secular con-
siderations unless those policies would punish a person for professing a re-
ligious faith.122  As the Supreme Court has noted, “The crucial word in the 
constitutional text is ‘prohibit’: ‘For the Free Exercise Clause is written in 
terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of 
what the individual can exact from the government.’”123  Government poli-
cies based on secular considerations generally do not mean the persecution 
of dissenters for their beliefs, and certainly not where appropriate accom-
modations are included for those whose faiths are extremely opposed to the 
policies.124  Courts have tried to deal with these hard cases pragmatically, 
as in the blood-transfusion cases, where courts have held that while parents 
whose religious beliefs prohibit blood transfusions cannot be compelled to 
obtain transfusions for their children, courts can still order such transfu-
sions by appointing guardians ad litem.125  But courts have never—and can 
never—hold that government is required to accord equal respect to magical 
thinking as to scientifically established and empirically sound facts.  To do 
so would simply be disastrous.126  Certainly it is not warranted by the Con-
stitution, which anticipates a government not only free to base its decisions 
on a
so. 
o Teach Means To Teach Well 
In Heart of Darkness, Joseph Conrad has given us a fitting image of 
                                                          
 121 David E. Steinberg, Rejecting The Case Against The Free Exercise Exemption: A Critical As-
sessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241, 276–96 (1995). 
 122 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (describing Ballard as involving the “punish[ment of] expression of 
religious doctrines [the government] believes to be false”). 
 123 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n  485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (quoting 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)). 
 124 First Amendment law is so complicated that it is impossible to make general statements with-
out exceptions.  West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), rightly stands as a monu-
ment of religious freedom in this country even though it struck down a policy adopted for secular rea-
sons, on the grounds that such policies violated the Free Exercise Clause.  Still, in that case, children 
were subject to discipline by the state for refusing to swear the oath.  Children are not subject to discip-
line for refusing to believe in evolution—although they must, of course, learn what evolution means. 
 125 See, e.g., In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct., 1989); Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King’s 
County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
 126 Where should courts draw the line?  I contend that the line should be drawn at the level of the 
right to consent.  Adults should be freely able to practice their religions and, of course, believe what 
they want, but should not be free to compel others: 
The State arguably should not assign any right—that is, any legal entitlement—to protect 
choices and actions that are not a matter of self-determination.  Such a right finds no sup-
port in general liberal political principles.  To view religiously-motivated child medical 
neglect as a First Amendment issue is as much a conceptual mistake as it would be to view 
religiously-motivated wife-beating as a First Amendment issue.  Additionally, this right di-
rectly conflicts with a principle that is basic to our legal and moral culture—namely, that 
no one is entitled to control the life of another person in accordance with their own prefe-
rences. 
James G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment Exemptions to Child Medical Neglect Laws: What We Out-
siders Should Think, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 147, 163 (2000). 
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al method, how can the average person possibly distinguish 
scien
nius from the crank, the idealist from the ideologue, the innocent 
from
publican polity—at least a polity with any diversity of viewpoints—without 
                                                          
the person who is made to memorize the factual conclusions of science, 
without being taught the critical th
cientific method.  He describes a cannibal who has been trained to 
 a steam-boat on the Congo: 
He was useful because he had been instructed; and what he knew was this—that 
should the water in that transparent thing disappear, the evil spirit inside
ler would get angry through the greatness of his thirst, and take a terrible ven-
geance.  So he sweated and fired up and watched the glass fearfully. . . .127 
Such a person, knowing only the conclusions but not the method, may 
pull the right levers.  But without understanding the techniques, he remains 
unable to master the physical world around him or to harness its energies 
for new advances.  And he remains vulnerable to quacks and con-men who 
can mimic a scientist’s language while making convincing-sounding asser-
tions.  This is the whole reason for teaching science in schools. 128  As Carl 
Sagan put it, “[i]f we teach only the findings and products of science—no 
matter how useful and even inspiring they may be—without communicat-
ing its critic
ce from pseudoscience?  Both then are presented as unsupported as-
sertion.”129 
Evolution and other scientific discoveries are included in science cur-
ricula for an important reason: not so that students will memorize the facts, 
but so that they will become equipped with the intellectual tools that they 
need to be critical and independent thinkers who are not satisfied with 
shoddy evidence, appeals to authority, dogma, tradition, or magical think-
ing.  Nothing is more important in a democratic society than that citizens 
be capable of innovative and discerning thought—that they be able to tell 
the ge
 the guilty, and that they be able to figure out what is true and what is 
false. 
Moreover, science is an essential part of the training for a free citizen 
because the values of scientific discourse—respect, freedom to dissent, and 
a demand for logical, reasoned arguments supported by evidence—create a 
common ground for people of diverse ethnicities and cultures.  In a nation 
made up of people as different as we are, a commitment to tolerance and 
the search for empirically verifiable, logically established, objective truth 
suggests a path to peace and freedom.  Our founding fathers understood 
this.  Professor Sherry has said it well: “it is difficult to envision a civic re-
 127 JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 57 (New York: Pocket Books 1972) (1902). 
 128 Of course, there is also the personal satisfaction to be gained by an accurate understanding of 
the world.  See Epicurus, Principal Doctrines ¶12, in THE STOIC AND EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHERS 35, 36 
(Witney J. Oates ed. 1940) (“A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does 
not know what is the nature of the universe but suspects the truth of some mythical story.  So that with-
out natural science it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.”). 
 129 CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A CANDLE IN THE DARK  21 
(1995). 
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y, nothing more deserves 
our attention than nourishing respect for reason. 
logy, history, law, or 
common sense.  It should simply not be heard again. 
 
                                                          
an emphasis on reason. . . .  In a diverse society, no [defi
mon good’] can develop without reasoned discourse.”130 
Science’s focus on empirical evidence and demonstrable theories is 
part of an Enlightenment legacy that made possible a peaceful and free so-
ciety among diverse equals.  Teaching that habit of mind is of the essence 
for keeping our civilization alive.  To reject the existence of objective truth 
is to deny the possibility of common ground, to undermine the very pur-
pose of scholarly, intellectual discourse, and to strike at the root of all that 
makes our values valuable and our society worthwhile.  It goes Plato one 
better—it is the ignoble lie.131  At a time when Americans are threatened 
by an enemy that rejects science and reason, and demands respect for dog-
mas entailing violence, persecution, and tyrann
III.  CONCLUSION 
The debate over evolution and creationism has raged for a long time, 
and will continue to do so.  The science behind evolution is overwhelming 
and only continues to grow,132 but those who insist that evolution is false 
will continue to resist its promulgation in schools.  The appeal to Postmo-
dernism represents the most recent—and so far, the most desperate—
attempt on the part of creationists to support their claim that the teaching of 
valid, empirically-tested, experimentally-confirmed science in government 
schools is somehow a violation of the Constitution.  When shorn of its so-
phisticated-sounding language, however, this argument is beneath serious 
consideration.  It essentially holds that truth is meaningless; that all ways of 
knowing—whether it be the scientist’s empirically tested, experimentally 
confirmed, well-documented theory, or the mumbo-jumbo of mystics, 
psychics, and shamans—are equally valid myths; and that government has 
no right to base its policies on solid evidence rather than supernatural con-
jurations.  This argument has no support in epistemo
 
 
 130 Sherry, supra note 6, at 471. 
 131 For a discussion of Plato’s “noble lie,” see PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 
OF PLATO 575, 629–30 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Paul Shorey trans., Princeton Univ. 
Press 1961) (1938). 
 132 See JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME 
(1994). 
